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Abstract
In this paper we examine the impact of campaign contributions on electoral
results in Argentine elections for the period 2003-2013. We provide a model of a
multi-party electoral competition with mixed campaign contributions. Using previ-
ously unavailable micro-level data on private campaign contributions we test several
hypothesis concerning the relationship between contributions and electoral results.
Our findings suggest that while parties receive both public and private funds, only
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private contributions are significantly associated with electoral performance –i.e.
the higher the ratio of private to public contributions the higher the vote share. In-
terestingly, while challengers see an increase in vote shares as a result of an increase
in private contributions, this is not the case for incumbents. One possible expla-
nation for this is that incumbents have other sources of funding available to them
–official advertising, informal campaign spending- which are substitutes to formal
private funding. This intuition has important implications for policy design as lim-
iting or prohibiting private contributions in the legal regime may actually be more
detrimental to challengers than to incumbents, with the likely effect of increasing
incumbency advantage.
JEL Codes: D70; D72; D73; D78
1 Background and motivation
“There are two things that are
important in politics. The first is
money and I can’t remember what the
second one is”
Marcus A. Hanna, 1895
The relationship between money and politics has long attracted the attention of scholars
in political science and other social sciences. Theoretical work in the late 80’s and early
90’s in the field of political economy fueled a surge in research in this field. The inter-
est is not merely academic since in recent decades, the spread of democratic conditions
through the developing word has brought along various concerns regarding the effective
functioning of political institutions. One such concern is related with the role of money in
politics, or more specifically, political and electoral finance. This concern is particularly
relevant for most Latin American countries which have sustained democratic conditions
for several decades and have evolved into increasingly complex democracies with multiple
political and economic actors. Argentina is of specific interest due to both its federal
arrangement and its changing dynamic of party politics. While there are several studies
of the relationship between campaign contributions and electoral outcomes for established
democracies, very little theoretical and empirical research has been conducted for Latin
American countries and specifically for Argentina.
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This issue is all the more important considering the recent debate in the region concern-
ing accountability and transparency and the efforts aimed at improving the institutional
design and its implementation. A recent study conducted by IDEA International (2012)
shows that 23% of democratic countries do not have any regulation on political finance.
As the recent wave of democratization sweeps across much of the globe, more democratic
countries are likely to introduce regulations on political finance. In Argentina, public
funding of parties dates back to 1957 but only in recent years there have been significant
changes in the institutional framework devised to regulate political finance1
In this paper, we focus exclusively on electoral finance. In other words, we are interested
in exploring whether money before the election has any effect on electoral outcomes. We
explore some extensions on the possible effects contributions after the election may have
on electoral results and on policies. Policies may be secured with money before or after
the election. But in order to test the predictions of our model we need to gather data on
money that goes through informal (and illegal) channels.
There is evidence that money into politics has become ever more important in Argentina.
In the last decade, total contributions to all political parties in were over 25 million
Argentine pesos in 2005 and more than doubled in 2013 in constant terms2. In current
princes, all parties received a total of 266 million Argentine pesos in the legislative election
of 2013; some electoral experts suggest that it would take around 800 million pesos for a
challenger to contest the 2015 Presidential election. That is three times as much money
for only one party than what all parties received only two years ago3. However, if we
look at the structure of financing, a clear pattern emerge: private contributions have been
increasing throughout the last decade both in nominal and real terms and as a fraction
of total contributions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section
3 introduces some theoretical considerations. Section 4 outlines the system of electoral
1One of these changes was to outlaw private contributions from corporate and business firms donors
in 2009. The stated goal behind that regulation was to limit the influence of special interest groups
on electoral outcomes through formal channels. There is much debate whether this regulation actually
improved transparency and accountability since it may have in fact encouraged informal donations by
these special interest groups. We will address this issue later in the paper.
2Note that we used private inflation estimates to deflate. Using official inflation mesaures, money in
politics increases as many as 5 times.
3In fact, the legal spending limit for any party for the 2015 Presidential election is around 250 million
pesos
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finance in Argentina. Section 5 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 6
presents a discussion of the results and implications.
2 A survey of the literature
Despite an increasing flow of academic studies, very little in terms of comparative work
or empiric studies has been done. The narrowest definition of “political finance” we
could try is “money for electionneering”. In general terms, it refers to all money in the
political process, but it takes so many forms that it is difficult to define. Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this paper, “political finance” will be understood to mean the financing
of ongoing political party activities and electoral campaigns (it is beyond the scope of
this paper to cover all the interconnected aereas related to money in politics). There
is discussion around the world about the best way or most appropriate model to face
political finance. From the 1950’s, a great number of countries has incorporated a mixed
(private and public) political funding process in their internal law. According to a study
conducted by IDEA International in 2012, 66% of countries (-out of 175)- have adopted
a strictly public funding system for regulating aspects of political and electoral finance.
Other countries use a mixed system of political financing. Karl Nassmacher considers
that the percentage of public funding in relation to total funding (total income) varies
in each country: from 2% (United Kingdom) and 3% (USA), to 65% (Sweden) and 68%
(Austria).
Using a unique dataset collected from several sources –Poder Ciudadano, Camara Nacional
Electoral, AFIP Codification of Economic Activities, and the Ministerio del Interior– we
test the model using data for all the national elections –Presidential and Legislative, both
definitive and primaries- from 2007 through 2013. In this paper, we are interested in
several hypothesis. Firstly, we explore the relevance of the amount of private contribu-
tions (relative to public funding) in explaining electoral results for both “incumbents”
and “challengers”. Secondly, we investigate the relationship between the composition of
private contributions, according to whether they are individual or corporate and whether
they represent sectoral interests, and the electoral performance of political parties. In
particular, we are interested in exploring whether sectoral interest align with certain par-
ties. Additionally, we test the hypothesis contesting the ideological motive relative to
the influence-buying motive as the driver for the private contributions. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use microdata on campaign contributions to
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examine the relationship between electoral finance and election results for Argentina. In
this paper, we use both formal theoretical models and quantitative techniques.
The study of the relationship between money and politics can be divided into four sep-
arate areas. Early studies looked into the electoral effect of campaign contributions.
Although the large majority of these studies find either a relatively small positive effect
or no significant effect of private campaign contributions on electoral results, the findings
are conflicting. Some studies find that electoral returns to private campaign contributions
are much higher for the challenger than for the incumbent, given the incumbent’s cam-
paign spending [[Jacobson (1978, 1985), Abramowitz (1988), Chappell (1982), and Palda
and Palda (1998)]. There are also those studies which find that electoral returns to both
incumbent and challenger are equally effective while there are also those which find that
neither is significantly related with electoral results [Green and Krasno (1988), Gerber
(1998), Levitt (1994)]. Finally, a small number of studies find that campaign spending
has a negative effect on incumbents election chances in legislative elections [Feldman and
Jondrow (1984) and Ragsdale and Cook (1987)]. More recently, it has been suggested
[[Green and Krasno (1988), Gerber (1998), Moon (2002)] that the independent variable
–campaign spending- is likely to be influenced by the dependent variable –some measure
of electoral returns; taking this into account, these authors find that there are no signif-
icant differences between the electoral returns of campaign spending for incumbents and
challengers. These results are somewhat puzzling against the evidence that politicians
seem to invest a lot of effort in raising funds and in light of the popular belief that money
wins elections.
It is undeniable that the relationship between political finance and electoral results is not a
straightforward one and in fact, electoral results are determined by several other variables.
The relationship between campaign contributions and election results has been widely
studied in the United States. However, studies of this type for Latin America are scarce;
in the case of Argentina, aside from Rubio (1997) and Ferreira Rubio et al. (2004) and a
few other studies analyzing the political financing system, there are no empirical studies
that deal with this issue. In fact, we find that the studies around political contributions
and the effects of this in the political game applied in Argentina is almost inexistent; the
only study that tries to provide an analysis of this phenomenon we find it in Samuels (2001)
in which the author analyses the role of contributions and the relationship of this and
the electoral results in a particular field around incumbents and challengers, and finally
compares this structure whit the system of United States. But as we noted earlier this
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concern is particularly relevant for Argentina where sustained democratic conditions for
three decades have shaped an increasingly complex multi-party democracy with multiple
political and economic actors. Now, before going into the details of the Argentine case,
we need to be clear about the previous studies around this subject, which as stated
earlier involves many hypotheses and variables. Our main concern has to do with the role
of the groups of interest, private contributions, electoral results and lobbying. Looking
at this phenomenon we must realize first that the game has to have a playfield, and this
playfield is configured by the electoral institutions, electoral system, the role of the players
(incumbent and challenger) and the advantages and disadvantages of each. First of all, it
is clear that interest groups make contributions in order to influence the legislation into
his favor [Kau et al. (1982); Frendreis and Waterman (1985); Tosini and Tower (1987)].
Of course these contributions are heterogeneous in nature and have different origin –i.e.
private donors, public donors, other donors. Now, what do the different studies say about
this phenomenon in different places? Stratmann (1991) concludes in his paper that that
campaign contributions from not only one period, but from at least two periods, are
important predictors of legislative voting. Contributions that are given at approximately
the same time as the vote have a larger impact on the congressional voting behavior than
contributions that the legislator received to win the last popular election, looking at this
we realize that the time variable is very important and is a very powerful card to play
by the different groups of interest. But the real question is how we can see the results of
these contributions? Specifically, what are “political favors” that the lobbys win? Like
we said early it has to do primarly with the legislative part in order to get legislations
and laws that follow their interests.
3 Theoretical considerations
Electoral competition between political parties represents a key aspect of political or-
ganization of modern societies. In recent decades, campaign spending associated with
electoral competition have increased significantly, in part due to the use of more costly
communication technologies. In a large number of countries, parties meet their campaign
expenditures using three sources of funding: contributions from individuals, contributions
from firms and special interest groups and contributions from the public sector. This is
not only true for Latin American countries but also for most European countries. The
evidence shows that in many cases public contributions outweigh private contributions by
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Table 1: Structure of campaign contributions: Argentina,2005-2013
Source 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Period avg
Public 0.48 0.77 0.69 0.87 0.77 0.72
Private 0.23 0.17 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.20
Other 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
a large margin. Table 1 shows the numbers for Argentina4 contributions.
Despite the evidence that most electoral finance around the world takes the form of mixed
financing, most of the existing theoretical models analyze only extreme cases: either a
pure public or a pure private case. The goal of this paper is to contribute to this literature
by considering the mixed case –i.e parties finance their campaigns using both public and
private funds. The mixed case is particularly interesting since both sources of finance
trigger divergent forces of electoral competition and they different intertemporal impli-
cations. When it comes to private finance, parties are induced to design and announce
policy proposals aligned with the preferences and interests of potential donors for the
present election. This is not the case for public finance since it rewards parties on the
basis of their vote shares in precedent elections.
In a two-party system scenario with voters preferences defined as usual, both forms of
campaign finance affect policy positions in contrasting ways. While increasing public
funds prompt parties to make less ideological proposals and converging to the median,
vying for private funds creates an incentive for parties to propose more ideological policies.
If we define the private-to-public electoral contributions ratio as PPEC = prii,t
pubi,t
where
prii and pubi are total private and public contributions to party “i” in year “t”, then the
higher this ratio, the higher policy polarization will be.
Another important theoretical implication associated with the effect of electoral contri-
butions is the relation between these and the vote shares of parties. If the two parties
are symmetric, then each party’s vote share will be equal in equilibrium and independent
of electoral contributions. If parties are assymetric, however, then there are different re-
4The National Electoral Office reports other contributions coming from non-governmental organiza-
tions and other sources of funding like central party reallocations specific for electoral campaigns. Aside
from the unusually large number in 2005 –mostly due to a change in the recording procedure which
considered many public contributions as “other” contributions-, these other sources of funding represent
on average less than 5% of total party contributions.
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sults. If we assume that the assymetry lies in one party being the incumbent and the
other being the challenger, then it may be the case that the challenger’s only source of
funding is private contributions whereas the incumbent may be able to use official budget
funds (non-campaign funds) to meet campaign expenditures and therefore influence its
own vote share.
If campaign expenditures have an effect on the popularity of parties as it is usually
assumed in the literature, then this assymetry will traduce in different vote shares for in-
cumbents and challengers. This difference constitutes what is it often called incumbency
advantage. Interestingly, this advantage seems to be inversely related with the PPEC
ratio: a reduction in private contributions relative to public funds have a greater nega-
tive effect on challengers than incumbents (as they have alternative sources of finance).
Moreover, for this reason, it is possible that stricter regulations on political finance con-
cerning caps and bans on private contributions to parties have differing effects depending
on whether they are incumbents or challengers and have the ultimate effect of shoring up
the incumbent’s advantage.
4 Electoral system and finance in Argentina
Argentina elects both members of the upper and lower house using a closed-list propor-
tional representation system with multi-member districts. Voters are only able to cast
their votes for a party or an electoral alliance, thus they have little influence on who
gets elected to either house. Twenty four electoral districts elect 257 members to the
Chamber of Deputies (lower house) and 72 members to the Senate (upper house). The
district magnitude ranges from 5 to 70 for the Deputies election. For the Senate election,
all districts elect three members.
There exists a significant degree of party fragmentation at the congressional level in Ar-
gentine politics. It ranks among the highest in Latin America besides Brazil. The Laakso-
Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties (ENP) measure has been on average around 6 for
the period 2005-2013. At the time of writing this article, there were 37 parties represented
in the lower house and 23 parties in the Senate.
Argentina use a two-round system for the national executive election which involves a
plurality system where a second round is held if the winning party fails to obtain either
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a 45% of the vote share or a 40% of the vote share with a margin of at least 10% against
the runner up. Legislators are elected using multi-member districts with closed lists and
a proportional rule to allocate seats to parties.
In each district, lower- and upper-house elections take place every two and six years,
respectively. In other words, every district holds lower-house elections every two years
concurrently but not all district hold upper-house elections concurrently. This means
that not all parties compete in all districts at every election. Nominations are decided at
the national-level party organs for national parties and at the state-level party organs for
state/local parties. The existence of both national- and state-level parties coupled with
the closed-list system has important implications in terms of electoral campaigning. In
an open-list system, a prospective legislator has an incentive to invest in political capital
outside her party to climb up the party list. This is the case in Brazil. In a closed-list
system, such as in Argentina, a prospective legislator has in incentive to invest in political
capital inside her party to climb up the ranks.
These circumstances favor the existence of non-individualistic electoral campaigns in Ar-
gentine legislative elections. In fact, this seems to be the case with recent elections where
most prospective legislators run non-individual events and accommodate to the needs of
the party. More specifically, parties may have to balance between loyalty and/or seniority
of legislator and popularity and standing outside the party ranks. Regardless of the result
of this balance, parties finance their campaign expenditures by raising money collectively
rather than individually.
Argentina has a mixed system of party financing. As “fundamental institutions of the
democratic system”5, political parties finance their activities with both public and private
funds. In this article, we focus strictly on electoral financing therefore we will not consider
the regular funding parties receive for institutional strengthening and development. Public
electoral contributions comprise a fixed amount of money for ballot-printing and a variable
amount of money for campaigning. The former is equal for all parties and the latter
is a function of past electoral performance6. Parties can also collect private electoral
contributions –both from firms and individuals up to 2009 when contributions from firms
were prohibited. All political parties are required to keep books on these contributions and
to submit two reports –preliminary and final- to the National Electoral Authority. Parties
5The fundamental provisions for the existence and functioning of parties are laid out in article 38 in
the National Constitution. This was introduced by a constitutional reform in 1994.
6Parties are required a certain amount of minimum votes to be entitled to this campaigning money.
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that fail to do that are fined and/or are excluded from the recipients of public electoral
contributions. To date, despite improvements in reporting standards, a significant number
of parties do not comply with the regulations.
One interesting feature of the Argentine case is that the legal regime governing politi-
cal and electoral finance has been modified three times in the last 10 years. The first
modification came about shortly after one of the greatest economic crisis in history which
triggered a political representation crisis. This regulation outlined and specified the struc-
ture, content, and delimitations of the regime of politica finance in Argentina. The second
modification involved changes toward improved transparency and accountability but only
minor modifications concerning the nature, amounts and types of donors. The third
modification included one very significant change which was to prohibit private contribu-
tions coming from firms, corporate donors and other institutional investors. Although we
would like to examine the impact on the structure of contributions of these institutional
changes, the avaialble data will only allows us to make some conjectures. This is particu-
larly relevant considering the discusion above in relation to the effect that tightening the
regulations has on both incumbent and challengers.
The current regime is potentially biased against smaller parties: since bigger parties
receive larger funding, they are usually those with the highest probability of winning the
election. Because of this, it is possible that private contributions are directed towards the
bigger parties7 . For example, for the 2013 election, public contributions to the main 3
parties represented just over 30% of total public contributions (out of 88 parties). The
situation is even more striking when it comes to assymetries in private financing: the
same 3 parties received almost 69% of all total private contributions (out of 60 parties).
As it can be seen, these assymetries do not simply result from the way the institutional
regime is designed but also from the specifics electoral dynamics.
7Political parties vary in number and depth in Argentina but they have been growing in number ever
since the political representation crisis in 2001-02. As of 2015, there are 77 nation-wide parties recognized
by the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral. The number of state-wide parties is several times higher. One of the
reasons for this is that there are low barriers to entry. Another reasons is that several of the bigger parties
have dismembered in the last 10-15 years and each faction has created a new party. In the period under
study, there are on average 11 parties –both nation- and state-wide parties- per district competing in a
legislative election. Many of the key electoral districts in terms of population size have a larger number
of competing parties.
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5 Data and methodology
The data used in this paper come several different sources8. The electoral finance data
came from three sources: the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral, Dinero y Politica and the project
La Ruta Electoral. This is to the best of our knowledge a unique dataset comprising
public and private contributions to political parties in all 24 districts for all the Argentine
national elections during 2003-2013. Electoral results were obtained from the Direccio´n
Nacional Electoral and were cross-checked with the Atlas Electoral Project when there
were discrepancies and missing data. The data cover several recent elections –the 2007
and 2011 Presidential elections, all the Legislative elections from 2005 to 2013 and we also
include the 2011 and 2013 primary elections9 Summary statistics for selected variables
are given in Table 2.
Since our main interest is to study the relationship between campaign contributions and
electoral results, the individual-level data were aggregated at the party level. This posed
several methodological problems. Aside from having a large number of parties, longitudi-
nal studies of Argentine politics are further complicated by the fact that parties are not
always comparable between two consecutive elections. One such case is when party A runs
for the election in year “t” and is part of an electoral coalition in the next election in year
“t+1”. Clearly these are two different units and should be treated as such. This problem
is aggravated by recording deficiencies from the official bodies10. We decided to select
the unit of analysis pragmatically using a Faustian criterion: use the party whenever we
collected disaggregated electoral data and use the alliance whenever this was not possible.
As a result of this, the unit of analysis results in “party and/or alliance” hybrid. This
strategy allowed us to use all the information present in the raw data without making far
fetched assumptions about the underlying coalitional dynamics. Since data on campaign
contributions are reported at the party (not alliance) level, we decided to add up the
contributions received by parties that ran within an electoral coalition11
8See the Methodological Appendix for detailed information on the data sources and the variables.
9We also obtained some data for the year 2003 but decided against including it in the empirical analysis
due to it being incomplete and sketchy.
10One such problem is that electoral counts and reports are not centrally provided. Each district uses
its own conventions regarding party denominations and alliances and there are different criteria to report
vote counts, particularly for the case of electoral alliances with some districts apportioning the votes
received by each party within the alliance and some others not disaggregating these data.
11This way of dealing with these problems meant three possible situations. One with parties running
without an alliance where voting and contributions data are available at the party level-; another with
parties running within an alliance where the voting and contributions data are available at the alliance
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
primary 2,722 0.27 0.44 0 1
afil 1,244 13,511.28 63,396.61 0 1,290,449
afilpop 1,100 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.20
sh 2,720 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.82
shpre2 1,410 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.87
comp 2,722 12.26 6.49 2 30
marginpre 2,722 0.22 0.18 0.001 0.84
cbole c 2,722 21,095.35 69,886.99 0.00 1,520,833.00
ccamp c 2,722 14,758.32 66,404.03 0.00 2,050,502.00
cprip c 2,722 30,631.51 269,602.70 0.00 8,960,474.00
cprie c 2,722 6,039.04 145,153.40 0.00 7,089,441.00
coth c 2,722 4,676.86 32,956.79 0.00 498,364.00
ctot c 2,722 77,201.08 451,841.70 0.00 17,602,446.00
cpub c 2,722 35,853.66 115,373.50 0.00 2,120,139.00
cpri c 2,722 36,670.55 391,319.10 0.00 16,049,915.00
cbolet 1,433 0.44 0.29 0.00 1.00
ccampt 1,433 0.30 0.26 0.00 1.00
cpript 1,433 0.18 0.31 0.00 1.00
cpriet 1,433 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.97
cotht 1,433 0.07 0.21 0.00 1.00
cpubt 1,433 0.74 0.37 0.00 1.00
cprit 1,433 0.19 0.33 0.00 1.00
cpripub 2,722 2,425.34 39,874.41 0.0000 1,733,173.00
incpre 555 0.06 0.23 0 1
incleg 1,367 0.13 0.34 0 1
incleg2 1,034 0.10 0.29 0 1
incleg3 1,035 0.21 0.41 0 1
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Figure 1 illustrates a partial correlation between our main variables, ratio of private
contributions and vote shares. Note that we use three sub-samples: the full sample, a
sample with only positive values –i.e. greater than zero- for both variables and a sample
for parties with private funds at least 25% of the total amount received.
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Figure 1: Private contributions and vote shares
Figure 2 provides a rough view of the heterogeneity between districts in terms of the
district-wide mean value of the ratio between private to total contributions. On average,
the ratio of private-to-total contributions is just above 0.18 for the full sample (left panel),
and 0.31 for the sample considering only those parties receiving positive amounts of both
private and public contributions (right panel). The province-wide means show significant
variation as can be seen in this figure. If we look at these rations by province, however, we
see that there is significant variation between them. Focusing on the right panel, the ratio
ranges from as low as 0.04 for Chaco (CHA) and Corrientes (COR) and to significantly
higher ratios in Neuquen (NEU) and Tierra del Fuego (TDF). This simple graph suggest
that state-level effects may be present when considering the relationship between finance
and votes. We will get back to this in our empirical specification.
If we look at the structure of party financing during the period it is interesting to note
that the regime change brought about by the Ley 25670 in 2009 appears to have had
significant effects on the structure of party financing. Looking at Table 3, we can see how
private funding has been decreasing as a means of electoral financing.
The structure of our data can be summarized as follows. Our main variables are a
level-; and another with parties running within an alliance where the voting data are available at the
alliance level and contributions data are available at party level. The first two cases pose no problems;
for the latter, we add up party-level campaign contributions to match up with the electoral data in the
case of alliances.
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Figure 2: Private funds as fraction of total funds
Concept 2007 2009 2011 2013
Ratio of private-to-total (full sample) 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.21
Ratio of private-to-total (positive private contributions) 0.53 0.51 0.32 0.39
Ratio of non-corporate (personal) to private (full sample) 0.84 0.89 1 1
Table 3: Structure of party financing pre and after reform
party/alliance’s vote share and the amount and structure of its campaign contributions.
These variables can be disaggregated by election, district and year. Hence, our vote share
variable has the following disaggregation:
shisht where i = 1, ..., N ; s = 1, ..., S;h = 1, ..., H; t = 1, ..., T. (1)
where shisht is the vote share of party/alliance i in district s in the election type h for
the year t. In our specific case, there are 410 i parties/alliances; s are the 24 provincial
districts; h are election types –one of where we have two alternative codings –one, sep-
arating between Presidental and Congressional elections; the other, separating between
Presidential; Diputados (Lower House) and Senadores (Upper House/Senate) elections;
and t are the election years. We include from 2005 to 2013 in our analysis.
In a strictly bi-partisan setting, the resulting dataset would most likely be a balanced
panel. In a multi-party setting with a large number of nation-wide parties, an even larger
number of state-wide parties and complex and volatile coalitional party dynamics, the
resulting data would be significantly unbalanced. Table 4 summarizes the number of
14
cases (parties/alliances) per year per district. Even if we consider elections that are held
in all districts every two years –Diputados (LH)- the number of cases varies between 140
and 339. Since this is clearly not well suited to conform a panel-data structure we will use
two alternatives for analyizing our data: complete pooling of observations and no-pooling
(mixed effects).
Table 4: Parties/alliances by election type and elective office
office General Primary
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 Total 2011 2013 Total
Diputados (LH) 181 339 271 154 140 1085 203 173 376
Presidente y Vice – 385 – 170 – 555 240 – 240
Senadores (UH) 46 110 101 43 44 344 62 60 122
Total 227 834 372 367 184 1984 505 233 738
In line with some of the standard models in the empirical literature, we test the influence
of campaign contributions on the vote share of parties. Our baseline model includes
alternative measures of campaign contributions plus aditional controls like the number
of competing parties and the degree of electoral competition in a district. The baseline
specification is therefore:
shisht = β0 + β1priisht + β2compsht +marginpresht + β3othisht + isht (2)
where shisht and priisht are the vote share and amount of private contributions received by
party/alliance i in district s in the election type h for the year t respectively; compsht and
marginpresht are the number of challengers and the the degree of electoral competition
in district s in election type h for the year t; othisht are other control variables –at the
party and/or district level; i is a random error term.
The models presented in Table 5 include all the parties that receive a strictly positive
amount of campaign contributions, either private or public. About a third of the parties
in the sample compete in elections but received no contributions at all12. It would make
little sense to include these observations since from a theoretical point of view, there is
no relation to explore. Empirically, due to the large number of zeroes, it woulc call for
a different approach. We define the variable of interest using three alternative measures.
12This may be due to different factors. Firstly, it may be the case that a party was not entitled to
public contributions since it failed to comply with the legal requirements to inform about its balance
sheet. Secondly, it may be possible that a party did not receive any private contributions.
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Firstly, we simply use the total amount of private and public contributions (due to inflation
during the period we deflate the series and these are expressed at 2003 prices) entering
linearly in the specification. The results are presented in Model 1. Both coefficients are
significant but its size is very small. This is part due to scalign but also to a relatively small
expected effect of contributions on vote share: an increase of one standard deviation in
private contributions (public contributions) would increase a party’s vote share by around
0.01 (around 0.06). Controls have the expected sign: the larger the number of competing
parties, the smaller a party’s vote share (comp) while the larger the margin of victory in
the district in the previous election (marginpre) the larger the vote share for parties.
Table 5: Regression results - Pooled OLS
Dependent variable:
sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cpri c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.00)
cpub c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000)
cpubt −0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)
cprit 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
log(cpripub) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
log(cpripub):shpre2 −0.01∗∗∗
(0.004)
shpre2 0.66∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
log(cpripub):comp 0.0000
(0.0001)
Constant 0.18∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1,431 1,431 1,431 911 891 891 891
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51
F Statistic 42.05∗∗∗ 57.81∗∗∗ 60.73∗∗∗ 243.57∗∗∗ 233.38∗∗∗ 186.49∗∗∗ 189.26∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models 2 and 3 use an alternative specification for the independent variable. We do not
use the total amounts of either contribution but rather a ratio of both public and private
contribution to total contributions13. We include the ratio of public-to-total contributions
13In addition to reducing the potential bias due to misdeclaration and missing data, since both public
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in model 2 and the ratio of private-to-total contributions in model 3. One surprising result
is that the coefficient for the public contributions ratio is negative, suggesting that the
larger public contributions as fraction of total contributions the smaller the vote share14.
The ratio of private contributions is positive and significant which gives the expected
sign. In model 4, we introduce shpre2 which is a party-level variable measuring a party’s
vote share in the previous election15. Despite our best efforts, around 25% of the cases
are dropped in model 4. Interestingly, this variable comes out as highly significant and
positive while cprit decreases its size somewhat but it is still significant.
Models 5 through 7 use our final alternative specification for the variable measuring private
and public contributions. This measure is what most closely approaches our theoretical
considerations. We define cpripub as the ratio of a party’s private contributions to its
public contributions16. It is interesting to note that the cpripub variable –ratio of private
to public funding- emerges as positive and significant in all three models. All other
variables retain their sign and significance except for marginpre. It should also be noted
that models 4 through 7 provide a much better fit of the model than models 1-317. Models
6 and 7 run some interactions between cpripub and comp and shpre2. The first interaction
is to see whether there is evidence of whether relation between the ratio of private-to-public
contributions and vote shares differs with the number of competitors in a district. The
second interaction is more intuitively interesting: whether the relation between financing
and votes depends on a party’s past electoral performance. Interestingly, it appears that
and private contributions respond to different theoretical forces, it may be sensible to take ratios as a
way of capturing both influences.
14This result would not look so strange if parties, especially incumbents, are using public funds to
finance their campaigns.
15This variable took considerable time to build. Due to the considerations made regarding the coali-
tional dynamics in the Argentine political system, we decided to build two alternative variables measuring
the past performance of parties. We define a strict shpre variable where for any party to be assigned a
“shpre” it has to feature in two consecutive elections with exactly the same name and without being in an
alliance. This variable meant that many cases were dropped due to name changes and not participating
in consecutive elections. For the second, more flexible, “shpre2”, we relax these criteria and include all
those parties which changed their name, which did not participate in consecutive elections (but had at
least participated in any other previous election) and we also tracked identical candidates participating
in different elections with different alliances.
16Since this ratio can include a zero in the denominator –i.e public contributions amount to zero-, we
make a slight transformation of all the data by adding a very small constant to all contributions. This is
to overcome the problems that an indeterminate fraction would bring along.
17Although not directly comparable, we ran models 1 through 3 with the exact subsamples used to
produce models 4 throught 7. The results are qualitative and quantitatively similar.
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the larger a party’s previous vote share the less effective private financing is.
Table 6: Regression results - Pooled OLS - Reduced Sample (Only positive private con-
tributions)
Dependent variable:
sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
cpri c 0.0000∗
(0.00)
cpub c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000)
cpubt −0.04∗∗
(0.02)
cprit 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
log(cpripub) 0.0002 −0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(cpripub):shpre2 −0.01
(0.01)
shpre2 0.59∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log(cpripub):comp 0.0001
(0.0002)
Constant 0.22∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 593 593 405 405 405 405
R2 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43
F Statistic 20.91∗∗∗ 23.12∗∗∗ 23.65∗∗∗ 79.28∗∗∗ 77.02∗∗∗ 61.61∗∗∗ 62.15∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6 reproduces the same models but using a smaller sample, comprising only parties
with positive private contributions. Thus we restrict our attention to parties that have
actually managed to attract private funding, which is one of the key motives behind our
theoretical considerations. The results in this table are qualitatively similar to those in
Table 5. There is a significant loss in the number of observations as only around 20% of
the parties in the sample receive private contributions larger than zero. Models 1 through
4 are qualitatively similar to those in the previous table. The variable cpripub, however,
loses significance in models 5 to 7. Whether this is due to the significantly smaller sample
or to the fact that we have missing variables, we do not know.
The previous models have not taken into account the structure of the data. We now
18
Table 7: Regression results - Linear Mixed Effects
Dependent variable:
sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri c 0.0000∗∗
(0.00)
cpub c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000)
cprit 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.09∗∗∗ 0.002 0.01 0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
shpre2 0.66∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 1,431 911 911 911 891
Akaike Inf. Crit. −1,126.64 −1,172.54 −1,187.92 −1,185.94 −1,125.62
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −1,089.78 −1,138.84 −1,149.40 −1,142.61 −1,087.29
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
take this into account by specifying a mixed-effects model where we introduce and model
party-, state- and election-level variables. Table 8 reproduces most of the models in Table
5 although we now introduce varying intercepts to control for differences in the effect of
private contributions on vote shares across provinces. We test different group effects –state
group effects (“idjur”), election group effects (“elec2”) and primary election group effect
(“primary”). Both the results (not shown here) evidence that there state and election
type contribute to explaining an important part of the variance in the dependent variable.
The results for the random intercepts are shown in Figure 3. Looking at the models, it can
be seen that models 2 to 4, where we use the ratio of private-to-total contributions are the
models that best fit the data. The coefficient is positive and significant and significantly
larger than in the previous tables.
Finally, we would like to test whether the relationship between money and votes is similar
for incumbents than for challengers. In order to do that, we split the samples and work
with two different sub-samples, one for incumbents, another for challengers. The results
of doing this are shown in Table. The most striking result here is that cprit has a different
sign for incumbents and challengers. In the first two columns, using the larger sample,
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Table 8: Regression results - Linear Mixed Effects
Dependent variable:
sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri c 0.0000∗
(0.00)
cpub c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000)
cprit 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
shpre2 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.22∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 405 405 405 405
Akaike Inf. Crit. −456.99 −463.17 −461.17 −459.17 −456.13
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −426.29 −435.14 −429.14 −423.14 −424.10
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
it can be seen that cprit is negatively and significantly correlated with incumbents’ vote
share while it is positively and significantly correlated with challengers’ vote share. These
results reproduce some of the findings in early literature on congressional voting in the
United States, despite the fact that we are somehow controling endogeneity using shpre2.
However, they are based on a rather small number of observations and caution is advised
when interpreting them. We provide a plot of the relationship between money and votes
for both sub-samples, incumbents and challengers in Figure 5.
More importantly, this difference for incumbents and challengers may be due to the so-
called incumbency advantage effect, which we do not capture explicitely in our estimation
model. One possible correction of this would be to include the official advertising expen-
ditures made by the incumbent government in the months prior to the election18
18To the date of writing this version of the paper, we have not been able to process these data. It is
available, however for the period 2012-2013, disaggregating every form of advertising hired by the national
incumbent for both executive and legislative offices.
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Figure 3: Random intercepts
Figure 4: Random intercepts
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Figure 5: Vote shares and private financing: Incumbents vs Challengers
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Table 9: Regression results - Linear Mixed Effects (Only positive private contributions)
Dependent variable:
sh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cpri c 0.0000∗
(0.00)
cpub c 0.0000∗∗∗
(0.0000)
cprit 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
cpripub 0.0000
(0.0000)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
marginpre 0.13∗∗∗ 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
shpre2 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 0.22∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 593 405 405 405 405
Akaike Inf. Crit. −456.99 −463.17 −461.17 −459.17 −456.13
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −426.29 −435.14 −429.14 −423.14 −424.10
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 10: Regression results - Incumbents vs Challenger Pooled OLS
Dependent variable:
sh
Inc Ch Inc (RS) Cha (RS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
cprit −0.06∗ 0.04∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
comp −0.01∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.01∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.002) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.002)
marginpre −0.03 0.02 0.06 0.13∗
(0.09) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08)
shpre2 0.45∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07)
Constant 0.32∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 123 265 80 112
R2 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.51
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.31 0.40 0.49
F Statistic 21.35∗∗∗ 31.12∗∗∗ 14.08∗∗∗ 28.15∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we make a first attempt at testing empirically the relationship between
electoral (party) financing and electoral results. Although still preliminary, our findings
support the hypothesis that the larger the share of private contributions in relation with
total contributions, the larger the vote share. This result holds even if we control for other
party-level characteristics such as the vote share in the previous election and the size of the
party affiliate base and other district-level characteristics such as the number of challengers
in a given election and the margin of votes between the winner and runner in the previous
election. These results are pretty robust to testing for alternative specifications and
different econometric techniques. One aspect we do not fully account for is endogeneity
of the independent variable cprit. Although we make an attempt to control for it by
including a party’s past electoral performance and interacting it with the cprit variable.
It may well be the case that the ratio of private to total contributions is a linear function
of the vote share of parties. At the time of writing this paper, we unable to find a good
instrument to test for this since most electoral/political variables correlated with private
contributions are also correlated with electoral outcomes.
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A Data Sources and Methodology of Aggregation
Data on public and private campaign contributions were obtained from three different
sources. Firstly, from the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral which is the national electoral
organ in charge of supervising party activity. Secondly, from the Dinero y Pol´ıtica website.
Dinero y Pol´ıtica was launched by Poder Ciudadano, an Argentine NGO which also serves
as the local branch of Transparency International. Their data was assembled on the basis
of the official records held at the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral. At the time of writing this
paper, these data were available digitally at http://dineroypolitica.org. Dinero y Pol´ıtica
provided the data for the 2007 and 2009 elections while the remaining years –2005, 2011
and 2013- were obtained from the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral. All these data come at
different leves of aggregation. Public contributions are divided between ballot-printing
and campaign funds. Private contributions detail individual-level data on name of donor,
gender, district, party the donation goes to and amount of contribution. After processing
the raw data to remove duplicates and consolidating multiple contributions from identical
donors in a single election, we are left with a database of around 40000 individual party
contributions for the period 2003-2013.
Data on election results and vote shares were obtained from the Ministerio del Interior y
Transporte for all the National elections –both Presidential and legislative- between 2007
and 201119 We also collected data from the Atlas Electoral run by Andy Tow when official
information was inaccurate or missing. Since the data on party and alliance names was
not homogeneous between these two sources –in several cases, the names of the parties in
two different electoral districts or election years did not match even when using that same
data source-, we had to homogeneize and recode party and alliance names using the party
and alliance codes registered in the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral. This was necessary to
avoid recording one party as two different parties if indeed the differences were only due
to a mismatch in the names contained in the data sources. Another issue was deciding on
how to assign individual campaign contributions –on a party or alliance basis. In order to
maximize the number of observations, we decided to use the data as was reported in the
Dinero y Pol´ıtica database. The contributions can be directed both to the party and/or
to the alliance and this introduced some problems when pairing these variables with the
electoral variables –we worked with electoral results at the party level unless the party
19There were two Presidential elections during that period in 2007 and 2011 and three legislative
elections in 2007, 2009 and 2011. Also, in 2011, for the first time, compulsory primary elections were
held. We also collected information on votes for the two primary elections –Presidential and legislative.
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was part of an alliance in which case we used
Finally, we used the Administracio´n Federal de Ingresos Pu´blicos (AFIP) database of
economic activities to assign every corporate donor to an economic sector. Since there
are over 800 economic activities listed in the AFIP records, we recoded the activities into
29 economic sectors following loosely their coding numbers. These sectors are: Agro,
Ganader´ıa y Caza; Pesca, Miner´ıa y Actividades Extractivas; Industria Alimentaria; In-
dustria Tabacalera; Industria Textil y Calzado; Industria Maderera, Papel e Impresiones;
Industria Petroqu´ımica y Farmace´utica; Industria Plasticos y Caucho; Industria Vidrio,
Cera´mica y Construccio´n; Industria Acero, Metales y Herramientas; Industria Maquinas
y Electrodome´sticos; Industria Ele´ctrica, Optica y Fotografia; Industria Automotor y
Transporte; Industria Muebles, Juguetes y Deportes; Construccio´n y Edificacio´n; Ventas
Varias; Ventas al por Mayor; Ventas al por Menor; Servicios Alojamiento y Gastrono´micos;
Servicios Transporte, Almacenamiento y Transmisio´n de Datos; Servicios Banca, Seguros
e Intermediacio´n Financiera; Servicios Profesionales; Servicios Administracio´n Pu´blica;
Servicios Enzen˜anza; Servicios de Salud y Sociales; Servicios Esparcimiento y Otros; Ser-
vicios Organizaciones Pol´ıticas.
To integrate the “base partidos” we aggregated the individual contributions into a single
observation for every party that received either a zero or a positive amount of individual
contributions20.
20Note that all the registered parties complying with the regulations of the Ca´mara Nacional Electoral
are entitled to a minimum amount of public funds for their electoral campaign
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